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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION
On September 11, 1998 Brett Larsen (hereafter "Appellant'') was issued a
citation for an improper left turn and violation of the "not a drop" provision. The
citation was issued after an investigation of a June 28, 1998 traffic collision at the
intersection of 3800 South and Wasatch Blvd. (Record 1, hereafter "R.")
The State originally filed two Informations, separately charging the
Appellant with both State and County code violations. Appellant was charged
with violating the State's Purchase, Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a
Minor statute (Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209); the Open Container provision
(Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.20); and Failure to Yield the Right of Way (Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-73). (R. 14-16). In addition, the County charged Appellant
with Negligent Collision, a violation of Salt Lake County Ordinances §11.12.090.
(R. 6-7). The State later amended its Information to include Negligent Homicide,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206. (R. 14-16).
On February 5, 1999, Judge Michael K. Burton presided over a bench trial
which resulted in convictions on all four counts. (R. 3, 8, 31). On March 16,
1999, Judge Burton sentenced the Appellant to serve the maximum jail time
allowed for each offense, to be served consecutively. (R. 32-34, 53-55).
Dean H. Becker, the Appellant's trial counsel, filed a notice of appeal on
March 16, 1999, the same day of the Appellant's sentencing. (R. 50). On April

1, 1999, Dean Becker withdrew as the Appellant's attorney and Manny Garcia
entered his appearance of counsel. (R. 84).
Appellant, through his attorney, made application to the Utah Court of
Appeals to remand the case to the trial court for a determination of ineffective
assistance of counsel pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B. This
Court denied Appellant's 23B motion in an order dated June 15, 1999. (Utah
Court of Appeals Docket Event Listing p. 1).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On June 28, 1998, at about 9:00 p.m., Douglas King (hereafter "King"),
Kara Shinners-Little (hereafter "Shinners-Little"), and two friends were driving
southbound on Wasatch Blvd. (Trial Transcript 112, hereafter "T."). King was
driving a blue 1990 Subaru Legacy station wagon with Shinners-Little in the front
passenger seat. (T. 111-2). All occupants in King's car were wearing seatbelts.
(T. 116-7). About 200 yards from the intersection at 3800 South and Wasatch
Blvd., King changed lanes to avoid a car which had slowed to make a turn. (T.
113-114). King, driving 40 to 45 miles per hour, entered the intersection where
his Subaru collided with a greenish-blue 1995 Ford Ranger light pickup truck that
was making a westbound turn from northbound Wasatch Blvd. (T. 113, 115).
Appellant was the driver of that Ford Ranger pickup. (T. 16-19, 22). King did
not see the Ford Ranger until a split second before it collided with his Subaru. (T.
115-6). King did not see the Appellant's headlights or turn signal activated. (T.
115). Nor did King see Appellant's brake lights activate prior to the collision.
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(T. 116). King did not have any time to take evasive action or apply his brakes
prior to colliding with Appellant's Ford. (T. 116). King and the other two
passengers were injured in the accident. (T. 65-6,117-8). However, King did not
lose consciousness. (T. 116). Shinners-Little was rendered unconscious and
ultimately died from injuries sustained in the accident. (T. 105,118).
J. Henry Larsen, (hereafter "Larsen"), the driver of the vehicle directly
behind the Appellant's Ford witnessed this collision from his vantage point
directly behind Appellant in the left hand turn lane. (T. 58). Larsen saw King's
Subaru 50 to 75 yards away approaching the intersection in the right hand lane.
(T. 69). He estimated at trial that King's Subaru was traveling at a speed normal
for Wasatch Blvd. (T. 71-2). Larsen saw the Appellant stop at the red light. (T.
69). Appellant did not have his left blinker flashing. (T.58-9, 115). As far as
Larsen could tell, Appellant's headlights were not illuminated. (T. 59). When the
light turned green, the Appellant entered the intersection and paused for a
moment. (T. 58, 61, 69). After pausing the Appellant commenced a left-hand
turn at a normal rate of speed as if the intersection was clear. (T. 61). As soon as
Larsen saw Appellant's truck venture into the intersection, he knew a collision
was inevitable and honked his horn in warning. (T. 62). He then instructed his
passenger to call 911. (T. 61, 63). After the collision, Larsen exited his car and
contacted all the participants in the collision to render assistance. (T. 65-6). It
was Larsen who positively identified Appellant as being the driver of the Ford
Ranger pickup. (T. 67).

4

Deputy Brady Cottam, (hereafter "Cottam"), of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office, was the first officer to respond to the scene. (T. 16). He
identified the victims and the Appellant as participants in the collision. (T. 17-8).
Cottam also noted Appellant was 19 years old as of June 28, 1998. (T. 19). After
initially surveying the scene and summoning a medical helicopter, Cottam spoke
with eyewitnesses and took their statements. (T. 21-2). Cottam passed that
information on to Deputy Clinton Johnson, (hereafter "Johnson"), a member of
the Sheriffs Office Special Operations Division. (T. 22).
Johnson collected witness statements and also physical evidence at the
crash location. (T. 34). During a search of Appellant's Ford, Johnson located a
bottle of Canadian Host whiskey with the seal broken. (T. 34-5). The whiskey
bottle was partially empty. (T. 35). Having found this bottle, Johnson requested
that Appellant's blood be drawn and tested for alcohol. (T. 41). Appellant's
blood was drawn and was tested by Bruce Beck, (hereafter "Beck"), a
toxicologist with the Utah State Health Lab. (T. 44). Using the gas
chromatographic method to analyze the blood sample, Beck tested Appellant's
blood for ethanol (or drinking alcohol) concentration. (T. 45,46). He reported
the Appellant's blood contained a .009 percent level of alcohol in his blood. (T.
46,51).
Lawrence Stratford of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Major
Accident Team (hereafter, "Stratford") was charged with responsibility for
investigating the fatal June 28, 1998 crash. (T. 76,79). He found that there were

5

no skid marks that were related to this collision. (T. 83). Stratford indicated,
however, that he could determine from yaw marks left on the road surface that the
Appellant's wheels were still moving at the time of impact. (T. 81-5). There was
no estimate made of the pre-impact speed of the two vehicles involved, because
there was insufficient data at the scene to complete such a calculation1. (T. 91).
Stratford further testified that as between two oncoming cars, one of which is
making a left-hand turn, the car intending to go straight has the right of way and
that the driver of the turning vehicle must yield to oncoming traffic. (T. 90).
Lastly, Stratford testified that in the State of Utah, a person under the age of 21 is
allowed to have zero alcohol in his/her blood. (T. 90).
The road conditions at 3800 South and Wasatch Boulevard were typical
for a dry summer evening. (T. 20). The intersection at 3800 South Wasatch
Blvd. is well lit by street lamps. (T. 20). The posted speed limit on Wasatch
Blvd. is 40 miles per hour. (T. 21).
•' SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should summarily reject Appellant's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence on the Negligent Homicide charge because Appellant
1

In his Statement of Relevant Facts, and again in his Argument, Appellant interjects a comment, albeit in a
footnote, in which he claims that Appellant's mother provided trial counsel with "evidence" that the
combined speeds of the vehicles upon impact was 120-130 miles per hour. This information was contained
in an affidavit filed in support of Appellant's Motion to Remand under Rule 23B. As a preliminary matter,
the "evidence" referred to amounts to triple-hearsay. No declarant is identified, and Appellant's mother
claims to have obtained the information from a person who heard itfroma claims adjuster for an unknown
insurance company.
In addition, Appellant's Motion to Remand under Rule 23B having been denied, the affidavits
filed in support thereof are not a part of the record in this case. The affidavits are inadmissible in thenentirety for purposes of this appeal. Any reference to anything contained therein should be disregarded.
See State v. Bredehoft 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998).

has failed to comply with the marshalling requirement. Even if this Court does
address Appellant's sufficiency of evidence challenge on its merits, it should
affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. The evidence at trial proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant's conduct was grossly negligent and
was both the actual and foreseeable cause of Shinners-Little's death.
Similarly, this Court should affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction
on the Failure to Yield charge. Again Appellant has failed to marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. In addition, although Appellant
asserts that Failure to Yield requires a showing of recklessness, the Utah Code is
clear that for this offense, intent is presumed to exist if the act occurs.
This Court should reject Appellant's claims of plain error. The Appellant
does not provide specific examples that show the Appellant's substantial rights
have been prejudiced.
Finally, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's
argument that trial counsel was ineffective is unsupported by the record.
Appellant's ineffective assistance claims must also fail because he cannot
demonstrate that but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the outcome of the trial
would have been different.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON THE NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE CHARGE BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT.
As a preliminary matter, this Court should determine whether Appellant
has properly complied with the marshalling requirement. Appellant correctly
recites the standard of review for a sufficiency of evidence challenge. This
standard is derived from Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and provides that a
trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. See State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). "In order
to show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). The evidence
having been properly marshaled, it falls upon the appellate court to determine
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. In so doing, this
Court must recite and review the facts in the light most favorable to the findings
of the trial court. Id. As the Utah Supreme Court articulated in State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994),
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate
court under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to
find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the
trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
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determination. This standard is highly deferential to the trial court
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear
and the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore
considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold
record. Id. at 935 (Internal citations omitted).
In the event that an appellant fails to marshal all evidence in support of the
conviction, or demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient, the reviewing Court
should simply refuse to address the insufficiency of evidence issue. See State v.
Pilling. 875 P.2d 604 (Utah 1994).
In the instant case, Appellant has failed to adequately marshal all evidence
supporting his conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide. Although he
characterizes his challenge as being "primarily the trial court's legal, as opposed to
factual, reasoning" (See Brief of Appellant at page 2), he then argues at pages 10
through 20 of his brief that the trial court relied upon insufficient evidence to
convict. Under the circumstances, Appellant clearly bore the burden of
marshaling the evidence in support of his conviction, yet he failed to do so.
Specifically, Appellant fails to apprise the Court that: (1) on June 28, 1998,
Appellant was 19 years old; (2) that following the collision which resulted in the
death of Kara Shinners-Little, a collision to which Appellant was a party, an open
container of Canadian Host whiskey was found in Appellant's truck; (3) that
Appellant's blood tested positive for the presence of alcohol and that the trial court
made a specific finding that Appellant had consumed alcohol on that occasion; (4)
that J. Henry Larsen, from his position directly behind Appellant, observed the
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oncoming car of Douglas King from 50-75 yards away, enough distance that as
Appellant made his turn into the oncoming car, Larsen knew that a collision was
inevitable, honked his horn in warning, and then instructed his passenger to dial
911, all before the fatal collision took place; (5) that the collision occurred at
approximately 9:00 p.m., and although it was not yet completely dark outside, it
was dusk; (6) that neither King nor Larsen believed Appellant's headlights were
illuminated; (7) that neither King nor Larsen saw a left turn signal operating on
Appellant's vehicle; (8) that Deputy Johnson tested Appellant's left turn signal
lamp and concluded that either the turn signal was not on at all or was between
blinks at the time of the collision. In addition, the undisputed evidence at trial was
that: (9) Douglas King had not been drinking or using any drug on the date of the
fatal collision; (10) that he had driven that route in that car on hundreds of
occasions and was intimately familiar with both the intersection and the vehicle;
(11) that both of his hands were on the steering wheel; (12) that he was paying
attention and although he may have been "mildly distracted" by conversation, any
such distraction did not cause him to take his eyes off the road; (13) that King's
Subaru was travelling at a reasonable speed immediately prior to the collision;
(14) that King had no time to take evasive action or brake prior to the collision;
(15) that King was injured in the crash but did not lose consciousness; (16) that
Shinners-Little was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the crash.
Not only does Appellant fail to marshal these essential components of the
evidence supporting the conviction, he interjects into his version of the facts items

which simply are not part of the record. For instance, on page 12 of his Brief,
Appellant argues that "while the Subaru was obviously visible to J. Henry Larsen,
it may not have been to Brett Larsen." And similarly, he argues that "the Subaru
may well have come over the hill crest, and come out from the slow-moving car in
the left land, and thus into Brett Larsen's range of view, after Larsen looked ahead
on Wasatch Boulevard and saw the way was clear." (See Brief of Appellant at
page 12). The State submits that such argument in the context of marshalling the
evidence in support of the conviction is inappropriate. First and perhaps foremost,
Appellant elected not to testify during his trial. As a result, any speculation as to
what Appellant saw and when is just that - pure speculation. More importantly,
this alternate version of what may have occurred on June 28, 1998, including what
Appellant may have seen, is not a part of the record below and this Court should
ignore it in its entirety. Secondly, Appellant should not now be permitted to argue
the facts as they were presented at trial. The marshalling requirement compels an
Appellant to do precisely the opposite. Such argument is akin to Appellant's
failure in State v. Decorso, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,15 (Utah 1999), in which the
Supreme Court chastised the appellant for "merely argu[ing] selected] portions of
the evidence which he believes supports] his own position." Here, as in Decorso,
Appellant utterly fails in his burden to marshal the evidence, and the evidence he
has marshaled he disputes based upon theories and possibilities not a part of the
record. Because Appellant has woefully failed to marshal the evidence in support
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of his conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide, the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
In the event that this Court elects to address Appellant's insufficiency of
evidence claim on its merits, it must next examine whether the State presented
sufficient evidence at trial through which the trial court could have convicted the
Appellant of Negligent Homicide. Negligent Homicide occurs when "the actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-206 (1999). A person acts with criminal negligence when:
[H]e ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviations from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1999).
Once again, this Court must review the evidence presented at trial in the

<

light most favorable to defendant's conviction. State v. Moosman, supra.
A. Appellant's conduct was the proximate cause of Kara ShinnersLittle's death.
In challenging his conviction of Negligent Homicide, Appellant first
contends that the conviction cannot be sustained because his conduct was not the
proximate cause of Shinners-Little's death. This claim is somewhat curious in
light of the fact that during trial, the parties stipulated that Shinners-Little died on
June 28, 1998, and that she died as a result of this collision. (T. 105). Not only

{

does the Appellant fail to apprise the Court of this stipulation, he goes on to make
the outrageous claim that "the relevant evidence is uncontroverted that the grossly
negligent driving of Douglas King was the intervening proximate cause of Kara
Skinners-Little's [sic] death." See Brief of Appellant at page 14. Not only is the
evidence not uncontroverted as to that claim, there is simply no evidence to
support it at all. During trial, the court allowed Appellant to pursue the notion of
contributory negligence, over the objection of the State. (See Transcript at pages
98-99). Trial counsel inquired of the State's accident reconstructionist as to
possible issues of contributory negligence on the part of Douglas King. The
Court allowed that line of questioning, indicating "I think the law does recognize
mitigation of your duties, so yea, I think it's a relevant question." (T. 99).
Furthermore, during closing argument, defense counsel appealed to the trial judge
to find that Mr. King bore some responsibility for the collision. He conceded his
client's own negligence, but went on to assert that Mr. King was as negligent or
perhaps more so than the Appellant himself. (See Transcript at pages 128 - 132).
Despite any evidence presented that King was contributorily negligent (and the
State does not concede that any such evidence was presented) and despite his
closing argument urging the trial judge to find contributory negligence on the part
of King, the trial judge found that Appellant was criminally negligent. In so
doing, he must have rejected the notion that any person's negligence was greater
than Appellant's, and therefore rejected any possibility that any person other than
Appellant had caused the victim's death.
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In State v. Hallett 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the appellant argued at trial
that his actions were not the proximate cause of the victim's death, an argument
similar to the Appellant's arguments here on appeal. There, however, appellant
argued that the victim exceeded the posted speed limit and created an intervening
cause of death. The trial court had rejected that argument, and the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed, indicating that "the evidence just referred to would not
necessarily compel the trial court to believe that the deceased was exceeding 25
mph" as she approached the intersection at issue. Id. at 338. Moreover, the Court
concluded, even if she had been so speeding, "the reasonable and proper
assumption is that if the stop sign [which the appellant had intentionally removed]
had been there, she would have heeded it and there would have been no
collision." Id. In the instant case, as in Hallett, there was nothing presented that
would have compelled the trial court to conclude that Douglas King was
negligent or in violation of any statute at the time of the collision. No one so
testified and he was never charged with a criminal offense. Despite being
allowed to present a contributory negligence-based argument, the defense was
unable to overcome the evidence presented as to Appellant's criminal negligence.
There simply was no competent evidence presented at trial that tended to show
that King was negligent or in any way contributed to Shinners-Little's death.
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It is also important to note that in Hallett, the Utah Supreme Court recited
a third proposition - the notion that:
[W]here a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril,
his action can properly be found to be the proximate cause of a
resulting injury, even though later events which combined to cause
the injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act
is something which can reasonably be expected to follow in the
natural sequence of events. Id. at 339.
Like Hallett, the Appellant fails to demonstrate conclusively that King was
speeding, passed illegally, or failed to maintain a proper lookout such that his
conduct led to Shinners-Little's death. King had the right of way through the
intersection and the Appellant failed to yield that right of way to King. Even
assuming that the Appellant's factual representations are true, King's conduct
does not diminish or absolve the Appellant of his statutory duty to yield to
oncoming traffic. See State v. Busbv, 102 Utah 416 (Utah 1942) ("Even if the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, if the defendant was guilty of
criminal negligence . . . and such negligence caused or contributed to the death,
the fact that the decedent himself may have been guilty of negligence which also
contributed, would not excuse the defendant.")
B. The death of Shinners-Little was a foreseeable consequence of
Appellant's conduct.
If this Court determines that Appellant's conduct was the proximate cause
of the victim's death, it must then analyze whether that death was a foreseeable
consequence of Appellant's conduct. The State once again invites this Court's
attention to State v. Hallett, supra. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court provides
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a sort of blueprint for analyzing cases involving criminal negligence. The Court
first announces that "proximate cause is the cause which through its natural and
foreseeable consequence, unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, produces
the injury which would not have occurred but for that cause." Id. At 338. The
State has already addressed the issue of actual cause, as well as the absence of
any sufficient intervening cause. What remains is whether Shinners-Little's death
was a foreseeable consequence of Appellant's negligence.
It is undisputed that the law of the instant case is that Appellant, in making
his left hand turn, was obligated to yield when an approaching vehicle
"constitute^] an immediate hazard." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1998). The
Utah Supreme Court has placed a burden on the driver "making the turn as he has
control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement
cannot be made in safety then the disfavored driver should yield." French v. Utah
Oil Ref. Co.. 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Utah 1950)(emphasis added). The question is
whether, in failing to so yield, Appellant should have foreseen a fatal collision.
Appellant contends that he should not be held accountable for the death of
Shinners-Little because her death was not a foreseeable consequence of his
conduct. Again Appellant seeks to retreat behind the notion that King was
somehow more accountable for her death than Appellant himself. In so doing,
Appellant yet again argues the facts as presented at trial rather than portraying
them in the light most favorable to the conviction. What the Appellant may or
may not have seen or done on the evening of this fatal collision will never be
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known because he elected not to testify at his trial. In so doing, he left this Court
with a record consisting of only one version of the facts - the version presented
by the State.
In Hallett, appellant advanced a similar "foreseeability" argument. And
therein, the argument failed, as it should in the instant case. The Hallett Court
noted that "the defendant could not fail to know that stop signs are placed at
particular intersections where they are deemed to be necessary because of special
hazards; and that without the stop sign, the hazards which caused it to be placed
there would exist; and that he should have foreseen that is removal would result
in setting a trap fraught with danger and possible fatal consequences to others."
Hallet, 619 P.2d at 338. The State submits that these words ring as true today as
they did when they were written nearly 20 years ago. Certainly Appellant does
not contend that he was not aware of the function of a traffic light, and he is
charged with the knowledge of and responsibility to obey traffic laws as an
operator of a motor vehicle in the State of Utah. It seems hard to imagine that a
19 year-old driver would assert that he was unaware that his disregard of traffic
signals and laws would lead to collisions with other vehicles, and to possible
injuries and/or death. Appellant made no such claim at trial and indeed to have
done so would have been ludicrous. Certainly a reasonable person in Appellant's
position would have recognized the danger. Witness J. Henry Larsen, whom the
trial court characterized as the "ordinary person," (T. 64), testified as to his
conduct when he approaches an intersection and intends to turn left. And he
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elaborated on the reasons for taking extra precautions at that time. (T. 64). This
representative "ordinary person" essentially articulated the reasoning behind the
"Failure to Yield" statute, and the importance of compliance therewith. If the
"ordinary man," upon whom the criminal negligence standard is dependent, was
aware of the risks, Appellant is presumed to have been similarly aware. Because
the State proved that the "ordinary person" would have perceived the risks of
failing to yield to an oncoming vehicle, that same knowledge should be imputed
to Appellant. When viewedfromthe perspective of the reasonable driver,
Shinners-Little's death was clearly foreseeable.
C. Appellant was criminally negligent
Assuming, arguendo, that this Courtfindsthat Kara Shinners-Little was
killed as a proximate and foreseeable result of Appellant's conduct, it must last
consider whether Appellant's conduct rose to the level of criminal negligence.
Relevant law provides that a person acts with criminal negligence when he "ought
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
that the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviationfromthe standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's viewpoint." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4). The facts as presented at trial
clearly provide ample support for the trial court'sfindingof criminal negligence.
This Court should not disturb thatfindingunless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
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been made. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988); State v. Gum
904 P. 2d 238, 2241 (Utah App. 1995); Spanish Fork City v. Brvan. 975 P. 2d
501, 502 (Utah App. 1999).
In arguing that he was not criminally negligent, Appellant once again
relies upon an interpretation of the facts which finds no support in the record. His
argument is entirely dependent upon phrases like "it would have been legally
permissible to recognize" that Appellant was negligent but not criminally so, and
that a finding of criminal negligence is impermissible where it "is unclear that a
reasonable person in Larsen's position would even have seen the Subaru prior to
the collision." (Brief of Appellant at 18-19). A review of the evidence when
presented in the light most favorable to the conviction reveals that the trial court
rejected the notion that Appellant had committed only simple negligence. In
announcing the verdicts at trial, the court explained that "Mr. Brett Larsen's
actions today, due to these facts, has to be a gross deviation. Essentially, he
drove into the intersection, turned left, and made no perceptive view of the
oncoming traffic." (T. 139). The trial court made specific factual findings that
(1) Appellant intended to turn left at the intersection in question; (2) that he failed
to yield to an oncoming vehicle which was so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard; (3) that at the time of the collision Appellant was carrying an open
container of an alcoholic beverage, the contents of which was partially removed,
in his vehicle; (4) that Appellant was under 21 years of age at the time of the
collision; (5) that Appellant had consumed alcohol on that occasion. (T. 137-138).
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The trial court also found that the oncoming vehicle of Douglas King was visible,
given that witness Henry Larsen testified to having seen it from some distance.
(T. 138). Lastly, the court found that Appellant had made no effort to stop prior
to the collision, as indicated by the testimony that his tires were still moving after
the collision. (T. 138). After correctly reciting the legal standard, and having
made specific factual findings, the court announced that "it's clear to me that this
is a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person has to
exercise." (T. 139).
It is patently clear that, when reviewing the properly marshaled evidence
in the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence presented at trial was
more than sufficient to sustain a conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide.
This Court should summarily affirm the trial court's judgment as Appellant has
failed to marshal all evidence in support of conviction. Even if this Court
determines to analyze Appellant's claim on the merits, it must fail because the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
POINT II. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF FAILURE TO YIELD
THE RIGHT OF WAY.
The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain Appellant's
conviction for failure to yield. The State must prove the Appellant failed to "yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is
so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard." Utah Code
Ann. §41-6-73 (1998). The testimony presented at trial in conjunction with the

circumstances of the actual accident show that King's car was "so close" to the
Appellant's vehicle that it was an "immediate threat."
Furthermore, the State is not required to prove intent in connection with an
allegation of failure to yield. The failure to yield statute is a part of the Motor
Vehicle Code enacted by the Utah Legislature. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that "one who violates provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code] is presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his [or her] violation." Greaves v. State, 528
P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974). Pursuant to that case, intent is presumed, and
therefore the State does not need to show any more than the consequences of the
violation. Appellant urges this Court to find that the State was required to prove
his recklessness in connection with the Failure to Yield charge. However, such is
not the law in the State of Utah, and the State should not be compelled to so prove.
The trial court, as illustrated above, made specific factual findings having heard
the evidence and argument, and those findings should not be disturbed under these
circumstances. Because the State has proven that Appellant failed to yield to King
and no evidence is need to prove intent, the Appellant's conviction for failure to
yield should be affirmed.
POINT III. THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR.
To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must establish that an obvious
and harmful error occurred which prejudiced the Appellant's substantial rights.
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert denied 493 U.S. 814 (1989)).
In the present case, no decision of the trial court prejudiced the Appellant's
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substantial rights. Appellant apparently mistakes the trial court's rejection of his
theories as plain error. However, the Appellant fails to cite any specific instance
in which the trial court or Appellant's counsel impeded Appellant's ability to
present his case or prejudiced any other substantial right. Furthermore, even
assuming that there was an error, the Appellant cannot show that the "error" would
have resulted in a different outcome. The trial court's findings and orders
concerning the negligent homicide and the failure to yield are supported by
evidence presented at trial and do not constitute a plain error.
POINT IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE.
This Court has previously addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel, at least in part. Appellant moved for remand to the trial court for a
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
23B. This Court denied that motion based upon Appellant's failure to allege
sufficient nonspeculative facts which would tend to indicate ineffectiveness on the
part of counsel.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant must satisfy
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That
test states:
First, the Appellant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
Appellant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the Appellant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
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the Appellant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at
687.
Therefore, the Appellant must first show that his trial counsel's
performance was below objectively reasonable standards of representation.
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d516, 521 (Utah 1994). cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966
(1994).
Appellant's contention that his trial counsel failed to raise obvious
insufficiency of evidence issues regarding the negligent homicide blatantly
disregards his trial counsel's conduct during the course of the trial. The
Appellant's trial counsel vigorously cross-examined each of the State's witnesses
in an attempt to bolster his alternative theories regarding the accident.
Furthermore, the Appellant's trial counsel in closing arguments moved for
dismissal of the negligent homicide charge for failure to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Appellant acted with the requisite intent to commit the
crime. (T. 132). The fact that the trial court simply disagreed with the defense's
theory of the case cannot reasonably be imputed to defense counsel. In short,
defense counsel should not be labeled "ineffective" based solely upon an
unfavorable outcome for his client. Based on trial counsel's actions during the
trial, the Appellant fails to show that his trial counsel's "performance was
deficient."
The second part of the Strickland test analyzes whether "there is a
reasonable probability that 'but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of
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the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466
(Utah App. 1993)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Assuming that the
Appellant's trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to raise the
insufficiency of evidence issue with respect to the intent element on the Failure to
Yield charge, the outcome would have been the same because intent is presumed
for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah
1974). The evidence presented at trial was uncontroverted that the Appellant
failed to yield to oncoming traffic that constituted an immediate hazard. Because
the outcome of the trial would not have been different even if trial counsel had
raised the issues now urged by Appellant, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails on both negligent homicide and failure to yield.
On appeal, Appellant speculates that had trial counsel done things
differently, Appellant would have been acquitted. However, merely speculating
that "there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different"
does not make it so. (Appellant's Brief at 24). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. As the State has clearly demonstrated herein, it presented at trial
sufficient evidence on each offense charged, and secured convictions only after the
trial judge made a careful review of all of the evidence and listened to argument
from both parties. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot
succeed because he is unable to demonstrate to this Court that an acquittal on any
charge would have resulted had trial counsel's performance been different.
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Therefore, this Court should reject Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that Appellant's convictions of Negligent
Homicide and Failure to Yield the Right of Way be summarily affirmed based
upon Appellant's failure to properly marshal all of the evidence in support of the
convictions. In the alternative, the State requests that following an analysis of
Appellant's claims on their merits, the convictions be affirmed. The evidence and
relevant law as applied to that evidence demonstrates that Appellant's convictions
of negligent homicide and failure to yield are justified and grounded with
sufficient support. The Appellant has failed to meet the burden necessary to
overcome factual question decided in a bench trial. Furthermore, the Appellant
has not sufficiently shown any evidence of plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Appellant's
convictions for Negligent Homicide and Failure to Yield be affirmed.
plh
Dated this 0_ day of November, 1999
DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney of Salt Lake County
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-12. Violations of chapter-Penalties.
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor,
unless otherwise provided.
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 15, and 17 of this chapter
is an infraction, unless otherwise provided.

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way.
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the rightof-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102. Culpable mental state required - Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable
mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof
of any culpable mental state.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously";
and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206. Negligent homicide.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction
of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions

reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state
or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 23 B. Motion to remand for findings necessary
to determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon
a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective.

The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the
filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to
be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court
from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if
the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a
party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record
on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by
the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion
shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted,
unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any
reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded
to the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall
identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to
each such claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also
direct the trial court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days
of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of
good cause for a delay of reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct
that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed
or retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other
procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for
remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of
the parties or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require
consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand.
Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the
evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the
claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice
suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand.
Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the
order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of
reasonable length.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental
proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of
the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record.
If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been
transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the
record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire
record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other
appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable
under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.

